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INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES-THE
LIABILITY OF THE PILOT
DAREN T. JOHNSON*
INTRODUCTION
p RIOR TO A consideration of the liability of a pilot as that
subject is related to instrument flight rules (IFR), it is useful
to consider the basic question of whether there is anything unique
about instrument flight rules which enlarge a pilot's liability for
damages. In a very basic sense, a violation of an instrument flight
rule is a violation of a Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR). A vio-
lation of an instrument flight rule which proximately causes com-
pensable damages can lead to liability by the same judicial route as
violation of any other FAR. As documented below, the FAR's are
the implementation of the Federal Aviation Act of 19581 and their
purpose is "to promote safety of flight of civil aircraft."' Their viola-
tion is equivalent to violation of a statute, which is equated with
negligence per se or a presumption of negligence, depending on the
jurisdiction whose laws are applied.
A pilot who accepts an IFR clearance is required to fly his air-
craft in conformity with all applicable rules and regulations. Fun-
damentally, flight under the instrument flight rules involves navigat-
ing an aircraft on specified courses and altitudes. These are desig-
nated on special charts or maps carried in the aircraft, or stated
to the pilot by an air traffic controller who is "working the flight."
The controller's job includes directing pilots flying under instru-
*B.A., J.D., U.C.L.A., Attorney-at-Law, Los Angeles, Cal.
'72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. SS 1301 et seq. (1976), formerly Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 [hereinafter cited as the Act].
249 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1976); Banko v. Continental Motors Corp., 373 F.2d
314, 315-16 (4th Cir. 1966); see also Freeman v. United States, 509 F.2d 626,
630 (6th Cir. 1975); Wildwood Mink Ranch v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 67,
70-71 (D. Minn. 1963).
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ment flight rules to fly at altitudes and on courses that will ensure
safe separation from terrain and other known aircraft. Listening
to the rapid stream of directives from a controller who is simul-
taneously supervising the movement of numerous aircraft is almost
like listening to a foreign language. It is also a frequent source
of misunderstanding and confusion to instrument rated pilots, some
of whom are strangely too shy or too vain to insist upon clarifi-
cation from the controller. Regardless, the spoken directives of
the air traffic controller are as binding on the pilot's conduct as
if they were printed statutes.
Theoretically, there would never be an accident during an in-
strument flight conducted by a qualified pilot in a well maintained
aircraft flying in conformity with all applicable instrument flight
rules under the direction of an experienced air traffic controller.
Although the reality is actually not far off that ideal, experience
shows that catastrophic midair collisions and even crashes into
the sides of mountains have occurred during instrument flight op-
erations involving qualified pilots, experienced controllers, and well-
maintained aircraft. When these tragedies have occurred, they have
created for the courts many legal questions, such as: what assump-
tions can a pilot make from the fact that he has been given an IFR
clearance by air traffic control; and when does negligent conduct
of an FAA employee amount to a superseding cause that insulates
the pilot (or his estate) from liability. Issues unique to flying under
instrument flight rules have also arisen in situations where a pilot
operating an aircraft in controlled airspace with an IFR clearance
unilaterally decides to "cancel IFR" without communicating his
intention to do so to air traffic control, and thereafter crashes
into terrain at altitudes below the minimum required under instru-
ment flight rules. This article is certainly not intended to itemize
all of the issues regarding pilots' liability when flying under instru-
ment flight rules. It is, at most, a reference to some of the more
common issues.
INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES AND THE SUBJECT
OF PILOTS' LIABILITY
The pilot necessarily plays a vital role in assuring the safe pas-
sage of his aircraft and passengers, but his ability to comply with
IFR-PILOT LIABILITY
the demands of this role may be greatly diminished when operating
in the weather conditions for which flight in conformity with
instrument flight rules is mandatory. In an effort to minimize the
potential dangers of flight, particularly under adverse weather con-
ditions, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has promul-
gated a pervasive scheme of FAR's with which all pilots are obliged
to comply.!
Title VI of the Act "establishes a system of safety regulations
of civil aeronautics"' and authorizes the Administrator to prescribe
"[s]uch reasonable rules and regulations... [as] necessary to pro-
vide adequately for ... safety in air commerce."' The FAR's are
promulgated under that authority and have the force and effect
of law.' The Act itself makes it unlawful to operate an aircraft in
violation of those regulations.'
When an aircraft is involved in an accident and a suit to re-
cover damages is instituted, the claim is almost invariably made
that the accident was proximately caused by violation of one or
more FAR's. In these cases, the courts have consistently construed
the FAR's as being "safety regulations.. that are relevant to the
standards of care of negligence law.
The general rules of negligence law apply to aircraft accident
cases in civil litigation."0 Most courts have held that the violation
of a safety regulation constitutes' negligence per se, and this prin-
ciple has been applied with respect to violations of FAR's, not-
withstanding what might seem to be rather harsh results.1
In fact, the courts have applied some extremely rigorous in-
'See United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322, 328 n.3-4 (5th Cir. 1960).
'See 49 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(5) (1976).
51 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW 5 10.01[1] (rev. ed. 1974) [here-
inafter cited as L. KREINDLER].
649 U.S.C. S 1421(a)(6) (1976).
7United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d at 327; United States v. Airways
Service, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 843, 845 (N.D. Iowa 1977).
849 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(5) provides, in part:
"It shall be unlawful-
"(5) For any person to operate aircraft in air commerce in violation of any
... regulation . . . of the Administrator under this subchapter; . .
I See note 1, supra.
10Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1972); Franklin
v. United States, 342 F.2d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Schultetus,
277 F.2d at 325.
" See, e.g., Bibler v. Young, 492 F.2d 1351, 1358-59 (6th Cir. 1974).
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terpretations to the FAR's. United States v. Miller" is certainly a
case in point. That case involved a right-of-way dispute. Defend-
ants alleged that plaintiffs' decedent (Miller) had been guilty of
contributory negligence in failing to give way as prescribed, with
a fatal midair collision resulting. Plaintiffs contended that the
right-of-way rules were inapplicable because, by their own terms,
they "do not apply when, for reasons beyond the pilot's control,
aircraft cannot be seen due to restrictions of visibility." 3 Plaintiffs
based their contention on the trial court's specific finding that
"Miller could have maintained a reasonable lookout while ap-
proaching the point of impact and not have seen the [other air-
craft] because of his limited visibility and the camouflage effect
of the background."'
Faced with this argument, the Ninth Circuit held that
'beyond the pilot's control' and 'cannot be seen' appear to con-
template that only physical impossibility, due to such factors as
weather or terrain, should excuse application of the right-of-way
rules. Had mere difficulty of recognition or perception been in-
tended as the relevant criterion, more appropriate language would
have been used."5
With particular pertinence to the legal effects of FAR's generally,
the Miller court held:
It may be that in order to have seen the [other aircraft] against
this background Miller would have had to look thoroughly and
diligently in the area in which [it] was flying.... We believe that
this is the standard imposed by the rules, and it is not for the
courts to say that the standard is too exacting. 6
In this consideration, it should be noted that the regulations
provide'7 and the courts have held" that in case of an emergency,
1" 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962).
3 Id. at 707, citing a note then appearing under 14 C.F.R. § 60.14 (1977).
14 Id.
"Id.
16 Id. at 708.
17 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(b) (1977) provides:
"In an emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may
deviate from any rule of this subpart . . . to the extent required to meet that
emergency."
Is Easten Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 492, 498 (D. DeL
1952), afl'd, 207 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1953).
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the pilot may deviate from the regulations. However, each pilot
who does so is accountable and, upon request, must file a written
report of the deviation with the Administrator.1' Unfortunately for
some litigants, the pilot who deviates from the regulations may not
be around later to testify that his alleged violation of one or more
FARs was an exercise of "emergency powers" under justifiable
circumstances.
In what Dean Prosser has labeled "a considerable minority" of
jurisdictions"* which do not conclusively equate a statutory viola-
tion with negligence per se, the courts have treated FAR viola-
tions as evidence that would sustain a finding of negligence by
the trier of fact."' Evidence that a pilot complied with the applic-
able FAR's is admissible on the question of whether he acted
"reasonably"' but such evidence does not conclusively establish
the absence of negligence.'"
At this point it is appropriate to consider some specific issues
and aspects of cases concerning pilot liability. Most of these cases
involve flight conducted under instrument flight rules; some do
not. As was observed in the introductory remarks, all applicable
regulations are relevant, whether or not they are within the group-
ing described as "instrument flight rules."
In a number of more recent cases, the contention has been made
that a given pilot's failure to comply with applicable FAR's was
excused because it was a direct result of negligence by government
personnel in providing incomplete or inaccurate information. The
courts have noted in determining appropriate standards of care
that the relation between the pilot and the air traffic controller
19 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(c) (1977).
20 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
21 See L. KREINDLER, note 6 supra, at § 10.02[21[b], n.37.
In fact, unless there is a real threat that the jury might be "diverted from its
main task by indulging in an 'extended' examination" of the proffered regula-
tions, typewritten copies of applicable regulations should be admissible in evi-
dence like any other exhibit. Merrill v. United Air Lines, 177 F. Supp. 704, 705
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Compare Merrill and Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815, 817
(2d Cir. 1959) (a relatively small number of regulations sought to be admitted)
with Lobel v. American Air Lines, Inc., 205 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1953) (at-
tempt to admit the entire regulations manual).
"See L. KREINDLER, note 6 supra, at § 10.02[6], and cases cited therein.
23Id.
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is unique.' In the effort to enhance aviation safety, concurrent
duties have been placed upon both,' that is, "[i]n any given case,
one, both, or neither could be guilty of a breach of the duties
imposed. ' This situation of concurrent responsibilities has, at
times, been labeled a "paradox.""7 Whether the pilot or controller
will be found "more" responsible seems to depend on the ability
of the pilot to recognize and to appreciate fully a danger without
the assistance of air traffic control."M Although the pilot-in-com-
mand is deemed to be "directly responsible for, and is the final
authority as to, the operation of [the] aircraft,""' that direct re-
sponsibility may be significantly qualified where the government's
negligence is involved.
This was an issue in Hartz v. United States,'M where a con-
troller failed to warn a pilot of the hazard of wing tip vortices from
a large jet which had recently departed. The controller cleared
the pilot for take off, and a fatal crash occurred shortly thereafter
when the invisible but lethal vortices were encountered. The court
held that where, as here, the pilot had a "limited ability" to per-
ceive the hazard ("to judge movement of [other aircraft] on the
field"), as a result of which he never knew nor should "be held
to know all those facts which were material," the sole liability was
that of the government whose controller failed to warn of the
hazard of which he was "[c]learly ... the better one qualified" to
assess." The government's liability (as distinguished from its con-
24 Dickens v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 845, 854 (S.D. Tex. 1974), afl'd,
545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977).
2" Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d at 226; United States v. Miller, 303
F.2d 703, 711 (9th Cir. 1962).
20 United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d at 711.
27 Richardson v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 921, 925 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
2 "[A] balancing process is involved-the vantage point of the pilot will be
weighed against the Tower's superior knowledge or awareness of the pilot's dan-
ger." Id. at 926. See also Black v. United States, 441 F.2d 741, 745 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971), where the court stated, "[T]he failure
of the operator [a Flight Service Station attendant] to warn the pilot of the
presence of the storm in his path cannot be regarded as a continuing proximate
cause after the pilot himself discovered its presence, appreciated the danger, and
decided to fly ahead into it."
29 14 C.F.R. S 91.3(a) (1977).
20387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Spaulding v. United States, 455
F.2d at 226; Dickens v. United States, 378 F. Supp. at 854.
31387 F.2d at 873.
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sent to be sued) is grounded upon basic tort principles imposing
on one who undertakes a task the duty to perform it in a non-
negligent manner. Since the government, through its air traffic
controllers and Flight Service Station personnel, has undertaken to
supply much of the information pilots require to conduct flight
operations safely, there can be liability on the part of the govern-
ment when this undertaking is done negligently.'
The duty of the air traffic controller is established by govern-
ment regulation. The FAA publishes manuals for the guidance of
air traffic controllers, copies of which can be ordered from the
FAA. The air traffic controller is "required to give all information
and warnings [as] specified in his manuals." This requirement is
in the nature of a minimum standard in determining whether the
controller was negligent. The courts have expressly disapproved
"the view that the duty of an FAA controller is circumscribed
within the narrow limits of an operations manual and nothing
more."3'
The government's duty to provide certain information does not
obviate the pilot's duty to "exercise ordinary care for the safety of
his passengers and for his own safety under the circumstances
which confront him." The applicable regulation mandates that
"[e]ach pilot in command shall, before beginning a fRight, familiar-
ize himself with all available information concerning that flight." '
31 Indian Towing Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955);
Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d at 226.
"Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d at 226.
Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d at 873.
For example, warnings beyond those prescribed by the aviation
manuals must be given when danger is immediate and extreme,
United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967); when
danger is known only to federal personnel, United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964); when the controller is
better qualified than the pilot to evaluate the actual situation, Hartz
v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968) [See also Gill v.
United States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1077 (5th Cir. 1970)]; or when the
controller is able to gather more information or make more accu-
rate observations than the pilot. Hochrein v. United States, 238
F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d at 226 n.8.
15In Re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans (Moisant Field), Louisiana, on
March 20, 1969, 422 F. Supp. 1166, 1178 (W.D. Tenn. 1975), afl'd, 544 F.2d
270 (6th Cir. 1976). See also notes 53-76, infra, and accompanying text.
- 14 C.F.R. § 91.5 (1977).
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For flight under instrument flight rules, this information must in-
clude "weather forecasts, fuel requirements, [alternate airports]
available if the planned flight cannot be completed, and any
known traffic delays of which he has been advised by ATC."37
Air traffic controllers, without making inquiry, have a "right to
rely upon the assumption that the pilot knows and will abide by
all applicable [FAR's]," including the one just quoted."
In this context, the United States district court decision in
Todd v. United States" is informative. The court in Todd found
the government negligent in giving a pilot flying under instrument
flight rules a clearance which afforded him discretion to descend
from a "cruise altitude" in mountainous terrain without determin-
ing the plane's position or warning him of possible obstructions
should he descend in certain areas along his designated route. The
greater significance of the case lies in the finding that the pilot was
contributorily negligent, and that the government's negligence was
merely concurrent, so that under applicable state law recovery was
totally barred.
The court held that the pilot's
conduct cannot be justified by arguing either that the ATC cruise
clearance authorized an avoidance of [FAR 91.119(a) pertaining
to minimum terrain clearance altitudes], or that the ATC failed
to warn him of the dangers of a descent in the vicinity of Cheaha
Mountain. The clearance simply granted him a measure of discre-
tion to be exercised in accordance with standards of due care and
applicable regulations."
The court concluded that the evidence compelled one of two
conclusions: (1) that the pilot recklessly commenced descent with
little or no visibility in known mountainous terrain; or, (2) through
a lack of preflight preparation, he found it necessary to blindly
descend in unfamiliar surroundings without any communication
of his predicament to air traffic control. Either conclusion required
37 Id.
11 Baker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 471, 486 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
'384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975), afl'd, 553 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1977).
The writer considers the Todd case to be must reading for its statements of
numerous principles of law applicable to liability in relation to instrument flight
rules, and as an excellent example of judicial handling of the interrelated duties
of the government and pilots.
4 0 Id. at 1293.
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a finding of negligence. The court reasoned that notwithstanding
the government's aforementioned negligence, had the pilot "been
exercising proper care in his flight.., he would have been aware
of this potential hazard and would not have descended from the
4000 foot cruise clearance."'
Most appellate decisions adopt a hard line in emphasizing the
duties of a pilot to acquaint himself with potential hazards in ad-
vance, rather than countenancing blind reliance on air traffic con-
trol or flight on the basis of unverified or unwarranted assump-
tions. For instance, a pilot who had been told by air traffic control
to expect visual flight rules (VFR) weather conditions was held
to have had a duty to obtain additional information directly from
the Weather Bureau where he had actual knowledge from his own
recent observations of conditions indicating he would probably
encounter adverse weather on his intended route.42 Likewise, a
pilot in flight who became aware of potential icing conditions was
held to have had a duty to inquire as to whether such hazards
existed, and, if so, for how long they were expected to continue.'
This point is especially emphasized where the pilot knows he is en-
tering weather conditions which require that flight be conducted
under instrument flight rules."
As with most things, there are few absolutes. A number of well
reasoned cases recognize that there are some weather conditions
and air traffic hazards which cannot be fully appreciated by the
pilot without the assistance of air traffic control. These cases iden-
tify a number of circumstances and fact situations in which the
government's conduct is a superseding cause of the accident, so
that the pilot is exonerated from liability. The previously cited
case of Hartz v. United States,' in which the government had full
responsibility for a crash resulting from the invisible wing tip
41 Id. at 1294.
4' DeVere v. True-Flite, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 226, 228 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
'3 Somlo v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 827, 839 (N.D. Il. 1967), afl'd, 416
F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 989 (1970). "Blind reliance
on lack of information, assuming he [the pilot] did so rely, could scarcely ab-
solve him from the affirmative duty of seeking information that was readily avail-
able on inquiry . . ." Black v. United States, 441 F.2d at 744.
"Somlo v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 827, 839 (N.D. IlL. 1967), aft'd, 416
F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 989 (1970).
4 387 F.2d 870.
1978]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
vortices, is a case in point. With respect to questions of concur-
rent government and pilot negligence, the case of Gill v. United
States is also worth reading. That case involved little more than
an appellate court affirmation of findings of the trial judge on the
liability issues. 7 It contains, however, a good treatment of "the
government's duty to furnish accurately weather information in
its possession once it has undertaken to supply such information."'
Strictly speaking, the Gill case does not adjudicate a question of
a pilot's concurrent negligence, and it involves some verbal gym-
nastics as to "a" and "the" proximate cause which probably has
defense counsel in the case still blinking in wonderment. Cases
dealing with concurrent negligence stress the fact that intervening
concurrent negligence by the government does not exculpate the
pilot. The pilot's liability for his own negligence ordinarily con-
tinues, and may, in some instances, supersede the negligence of
the government. 9
As mentioned at the outset, one of the problem areas pertains
to the assumptions a pilot may make from the fact he has been
given a clearance by air traffic control. The contention that a
- 429 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd after remand, 449 F.2d 765 (5th Cir.
1971).
" The Fifth Circuit agreed with the trial court that the air traffic controller's
furnishing inexact, incomplete weather information constituted negligence, but
remanded for a finding on the pilot's negligence. A ruling that the pilot, too, was
negligent would have entitled the government to a one-half reduction of thejudgment against it. On remand, however, the trial court found the government's
negligence to be the sole proximate cause of the accident. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed that decision. 449 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1971).
48 429 F.2d at 1077.
49For example, in Black v. United States, 441 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971), the court held that any negligence on the
part of the FAA operator in failing to warn the pilot of a storm in his path was
superseded by the negligence of the pilot in deciding to proceed into the storm
after observing the poor visibility conditions. Id. at 745. Likewise, in Rowe v.
United States, 272 F. Supp. 462, 471 (W.D. Pa. 1964), which was relied upon
and followed in Black, the court stated:
The intervening act of the unqualified pilot in deliberately de-
scending into a solid overcast was not only reckless conduct, but
may be regarded as so highly extraordinary as to become a super-
seding cause of the deaths of his passengers, Rowe and Smith. We
do not think that any employees of defendant could reasonably
have foreseen such conduct on the part of the pilot.
See also Neff v. United States, 420 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1066 (1969); Todd v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla.
1975), a/f'd, 553 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1977).
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pilot has no liability because he was relying on a clearance as an
assurance that weather conditions were "safe" for conducting a
flight procedure authorized by that clearance have, for the most
part, fallen on deaf ears. Courts have consistently held that a
clearance is permissive in nature,"0 and represents only that existing
conditions meet FAA minimums." A clearance does not in any way
relieve the pilot of his continuing duty to act in the best interests
of the safety of his aircraft and passengers and to avoid operating
an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner. A pilot is required
to follow his clearance "not blindly, but correlative with his duty
to exercise care for his own safety from everything of which he
[is] aware."" If he perceives that conditions are unsafe for take-
off, he must, in the exercise of due care, refuse to take off.' If,
while in flight, he believes his assigned course is unreasonably
hazardous, he is free to reject an assigned heading." Regardless
5 See Allen v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 992, 1008 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
"' "When the controller clears a pilot for visual approach he is not certifying
that conditions will not change but he is saying that ground visibility then meets
the minimum for the method selected." American Airlines, Inc. v. United States,
418 F.2d 180, 189 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Neff v. United States, 420 F.2d at
120, where the court stated, "[It seems clear that no prudent pilot would have
construed a clearance for takeoff as implying anything more than the fact that
visibility was above specified minimum criteria."
52 The rules governing the duties of pilots, however, make it clear
that none of those duties are rendered inapplicable merely because
a clearance from a tower has been received. It is stated and re-
iterated that the function of tower personnel is merely to assist the
pilot in the performance of the duties imposed, not relieve him of
those duties.
United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d at 710-11. See also Allen v. United States,
370 F. Supp. at 1008.
51 Hochrein v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 317, 319 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
"'Neff v. United States, 420 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1969), involved the crash
of an aircraft immediately after takeoff. Plaintiff's decedent (Neff) was the First
Officer of the ill-fated aircraft, and piloted the aircraft during takeoff. The dis-
trict court found that the United States was negligent in operating the control
tower by failing to warn Neff of a thunderstorm on the field at the time he was
to take off, and that Neff was not contributorily negligent. The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reversed the decision as to the contributory negligence of Neff,
finding that taking off "into an obvious thunderstorm constituted contributory
negligence as a matter of law," Id. at 116, and that "[tihe magnitude of the flight
crew's negligence is not materially lessened .. . by the clearance for takeoff
which the tower communicated to the crew seconds before the fatal crash." Id.
at 120.
15 In Re Aircrash Disaster at Boston, Mass., July 31, 1973, 412 F. Supp. 959,
983 (D. Mass. 1976). There is, in fact, some authority for the proposition that
a pilot who encounters hazardous weather conditions must alter his course. In
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of which type of instrument approach to landing for which he has
received clearance, if he encounters visibility below the prescribed
minimums, he must immediately execute a missed approach." Air
traffic controllers do not have the responsibility for determining
whether a given weather situation is "safe for landing";"7 the final
decision as to whether to undertake the landing is solely with the
pilot in command.
The last area considered in this paper pertains to the situation
in which a pilot operating under an instrument flight plan uni-
laterally decides to "cancel IFR" without communicating his inten-
tion to do so to air traffic control. There is now pending in the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County a case entitled Jones v.
Jeppesen' in which a jury was previously unable to agree upon a
verdict. The case involves a claim by plaintiffs that a pilot who
had been cleared for an instrument approach to an uncontrolled
airport was justified in flying below the minimum IFR altitudes
specified in the vicinity of the airport because he allegedly en-
countered VFR weather conditions and was thus free to continue
flight without conforming to the instrument flight rules. Extensive
research by counsel for both sides failed to reveal an appellate
decision adjudicating this exact question. Plaintiffs contend that
the pilot's communicating to air traffic control his intention to can-
cel his IFR flight plan was not a literal prerequisite of the relevant
FAR's"9 and that a finding that he formed this intent upon encoun-
tering VFR conditions would free him of the requirement to follow
instrument flight rules. Defendant claims that FAR 91.75" clearly
prohibits deviation from instrument flight rules until the IFR
flight plan is cancelled, and that the Airman's Information Manuar'
Black v. United States, 441 F.2d at 744, the court stated, "Good, even funda-
mental, flying practice dictated the avoidance of the storm front that of a cer-
tainty loomed ahead of the pilot. He should have altered or reversed his course,
or better still have landed at the nearest suitable airport."
I American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d at 189.
-"In Re Aircraft Disaster at New Orleans (Moisant Field), Louisiana, on
March 20, 1969, 422 F. Supp. at 1178, where the court stated, "[E]ven had
Goertz's transmission been considered a clearance, only the pilot can make the
decision to land the aircraft. A duty cannot be imposed on a controller on the
ground to exercise operational control of the aircraft at decision height."
"No. C-62980 (Super. Ct., L.A. Cty. July 25, 1973).
9 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.75, 91.83 (1977).
601d., § 91.75.
11 FAA, AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL, part I, at 1-58 (1977).
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interprets FAR 91.83" to require communication. Without such
communication, the argument continues, the pilot is required to
follow instrument flight rules, including avoidance of flight below
IFR altitude minimums. After receiving extensive evidence, in-
cluding the expert opinion of Richard Shay," the trial judge, Hon.
Charles Older," ruled as the law of the case that the pilot under
such circumstances is required to conform to all instrument flight
rules unless and until he has communicated his intention to cancel
IFR either to the nearest FAA Flight Service Station or to air traffic
control. Should this question be presented on appeal, it is the
writer's opinion that the ruling will be affirmed. In this regard,
Richard Shay's observation is highly pertinent:
Especially when one considers how many flights are made pur-
suant to an IFR clearance in high density traffic areas during
VFR weather, if the rules permitted a pilot to deviate from his
clearance without first notifying ATC, how could the controllers
effect any systematic separation of aircraft? It wouldn't be a sys-
tem, it would be utter chaos.'
CONCLUSION
The number of aircraft and the number of pilots flying them
are large and increasing. According to FAA statistics published by
the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) as of Decem-
ber 31, 1976, 555,445 persons, excluding students, held Active
Airmen Certificates, of whom 20.57 percent were added in 1976."
Of this total, 211,364, or 38.05 percent were instrument rated
pilots."' In 1976 alone, some 31,394 new civilian aircraft were pro-
duced in the United States." In the same year, there were 13,654,-
62 14 C.F.R. § 91.83 (1977).
Is Richard Shay was one of the principal authors of the FAA manual known
as "TERPS," which is the United States Standard for Instrument Procedures.
"'Although Judge Older is best known as the judge who presided over the
criminal trial of the so-called "Charles Manson Family," he is a carrier-qualified
instrument-rated pilot whose flying experience goes back to World War II when
he was one of Chenault's Flying Tigers.
"Testimony of Richard Shay, Jones v. Jeppesen, No. C-62980 (Super. Ct.,
L.A. Cty. July 25, 1973).
16 AOPA, HANDBOOK FOR PILOTS (1978). The statistics, for 1976, are the most
recent available.
17 This statistic as to the number of instrument-rated pilots was furnished to
the writer by the Public Affairs Office of the FAA in Los Angeles.
Is HANDBOOK FOR PILOTS, note 66 supra.
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063 "Instrument Operations," which are flight operations con-
ducted under instrument flight rules pursuant to a clearance issued
by Air Traffic Control."' As the air traffic system grows, so grows
the need for greater control of it. The FAA is actively responding
to this need, with the emphasis on increasing the areas and instances
in which flight in controlled airspace must be authorized by air
traffic control, and, increasingly, may be made only by instrument-
rated pilots and pursuant to an IFR clearance. The comparatively
recent advent of Terminal Control Areas in most metropolitan cen-
ters is certainly witness to this change and increasing complexity.
Unfortunately, no amount of sophisticated management is going
to eliminate all of the catastrophes which occur in connection
with flying. Hopefully the frequency and severity of aircraft acci-
dents will continue to diminish. When they do occur, however,
they are very likely to result in damage claims in this increasingly
litigious society in which we live. The inherent complexity of this
litigation is demonstrated in practically every aircrash case, where
all "sides" commonly retain a battery of technical experts whose
voluminous tests and testimony are supposedly conducted to answer
one short question: what happened? Lawyers handling litigation
arising out of aircraft accidents assume a considerable burden.
Hopefully the citations gathered here will facilitate that burden
to some small extent.
